The lobbying literature provides evidence of firms shaping their regulatory context, consistent with corporate rent-seeking. We propose that such rent-seeking, where it exists, is unlikely to enrich shareholders at the expense of customers when firms operate in competitive product markets. We test this proposition through an assessment of the dissipation of the cash benefits accrued from corporate tax inversions. We find lower accounting and stock-market returns to shareholders of inverting firms in competitive industries (relative to those in concentrated industries). Further, inverting firms in competitive industries are more likely to improve liquidity and invest in R&D relative to those in concentrated industries. The evidence suggests that in competitive industries lobbying "rents" accrue to customers over shareholders.
Introduction
A vast literature studies the role of business in society, focusing in particular on the political activities of firms and their managers in shaping their regulatory context. Widespread belief and considerable evidence suggest that firms' lobbying efforts accomplish regulatory capture (Stigler (1971) ; Rajan and Zingales (2003) ; Dal Bó (2006); Carpenter and Moss (2013) ; Ramanna (2015) ). The lobbying and regulatory capture are alleged to represent rent extractive activities for the benefit of shareholders and managers of the corporation. Corporations' success in regulatory capture is partly attributable to their relatively organized and well-informed efforts in influencing regulators and/or politicians. In contrast, taxpayers or potentially affected consumers are a diffuse group with individually smaller economic stakes and less knowledge about regulatory issues. Therefore, firms have the potential to extract rents, giving rise to concerns about possible wealth transfers from citizens to special interests.
In this study, we propose that even if such rent extractions or wealth transfers were to exist, they may not enrich the firms' shareholders at the expense of customers. Particularly if such politically successful firms operate in competitive product markets, the rents accrued are likely to dissipate to the firms' customers. That is, in effect, rents are captured by customers, rather than the lobbying firms' shareholders, at the potential expense of taxpayers. And provided such customers are themselves a broad representation of the citizenry, the wealth transfers effected through the political process are reversed in product markets. If true, such wealth transfers may not be, strictly speaking, "rents" firms capture through the political process but rather attempts by firms to sustain a competitive edge in product markets.
The preceding arguments suggest regulatory wealth transfers are a greater cause for concern when product markets are (largely) uncompetitive. (Of course, this leaves aside an important question in democratic theory -whether it is normatively desirable to allow pricebased markets to achieve allocations intended to be achieved through political processes. See, e.g., Sandel (2013)) To test these propositions, we provide some initial evidence on the impact of product market competition on the allocation of wealth extracted through successful corporate political engagement. A convincing test setting ideally has the following elements -(i) evidence of wealth transfers from the intended beneficiaries of regulation to those being regulated, (ii) unsuccessful regulatory/political attempts at leveling the playing field, (iii) an issue that cuts across industries so as to make the inferences generalizable and also to estimate within-treatment variation in product market competition, and finally (iv) the events should be scattered over time so to reduce the possibility of other confounding events.
We select corporate tax inversions in the United States as our setting as it broadly fulfils each of the above requirements. Corporate inversion is a practice that allows firms to substantially reduce their tax liability, freeing up cash in corporate treasuries. Although the practice of such tax inversions has persisted over many years, critics on both sides of the political aisle argue that they represent aggressive tax behavior not consistent with the spirit of the US tax law. However, supporters of the inversions contend that this practice enables firms to remain competitive in product and capital markets, especially internationally (e.g., Mankiw (2014)), and, as such, attempts at closing "loopholes" in tax law that enable the inversions have been unsuccessful. Thus, critics of tax inversions have from time to time alleged that the practice persists partly due to corporate regulatory capture of tax lawmaking in the United States (e.g., Hodgson, 2015) . In this study, we do not take a normative position on the debate around tax inversions; rather, we examine whether product-market competition influences the distribution of the cash benefits of such inversions.
We identify three broad classes of stakeholders who may be likely to capture wealth extracted through the tax inversions -customers, shareholders, and managers. If rents do dissipate to customers, they are likely to experience this through lower product prices (lower margins for firms) or improved product quality (higher firm spending on quality). Similarly, if rents dissipate to shareholders, the firm is likely to record increased accounting and stock-market performance. Finally, if rents accrue to managers, we can expect increases in managerial compensation, perquisites, or empire-building activities. Of course, political rents can dissipate to all of the groups -in varying degrees -so we concurrently examine returns to customers, shareholders, and managers as response variables in our empirical tests. In fact, the relative impact of political rents on returns to each of these groups can also be meaningful in the context of our study.
One concern with our setting is that the incidence of tax inversions may itself depend on an industry's product market competition. Put differently, cross-sectional variation based on competition in product markets may not be exogenous to successful wealth transfers through inversions. We mitigate this concern as a confounding factor in our inferences by defining the state of product-market concentration within the sample of corporate inversions. That is, we divide the sample of firms that completed tax inversions into two based on industry competition in the year prior to the inversion. We thus obtain a balanced sample of inversions across more and less competitive industries, enabling difference-in-difference tests that generate relatively more dispositive inferences. We also verify robustness to the inclusion of industry (and alternatively firm) fixed effects that absorb all unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity across industries (and firms). This ensures that the economic consequences of inversions are not on account of industries (or firms) being inherently different.
Using a list of 43 corporate inversions over the period 1990 to 2014 (which updates Desai and Hines (2002) ; see Rao (2015)), we employ two sets of tests and find consistent evidence across both of them. First, we examine short-window market reaction to the announcement of inversions. We split the 43 announcements based on the extent of product market competition and uncover a distinct pattern -inversions in concentrated industries are associated with more frequent positive market reactions as compared to those in competitive industries. In particular, 16 of the 21 inversions in concentrated product markets generate positive market reactions and 5 elicit negative reactions. This split between positive and negative announcement returns is 12-10 in the competitive markets group. While the 16-5 split between positive and negative returns in concentrated industries is significantly different (p-value = 0.012) from a random chance of 50%, the split of 12-10 in competitive industries is not. These results suggest that inversions are more likely to create wealth transfers in favor of shareholders in concentrated product markets relative to competitive ones. They also indicate that prior inferences about the mixed value implications of corporate inversions (e.g., Desai and Hines, 2002; Rao, 2015) are more representative of competitive rather than concentrated product markets.
The second set of tests examines long-run firm responses to inversions to hone in on the underlying mechanisms of the value creation. We begin by documenting an economically significant decrease of 53% (relative to pre-inversion levels) in firms' tax rates after the inversion. Further, these decreases are of similar magnitude across concentrated and competitive industries -ruling out the possibility that differences in firm outcomes after the inversion could be driven by the differential tax impact of the inversion across these groups. Our results depict a clear dichotomy between concentrated and competitive industries in the manner in which they use the tax-savings from inversions. Firms in concentrated industries are more likely to use these proceeds to increase payouts to shareholders (via stock repurchases), while those in competitive industries are more likely to invest these cash flows in innovation activities (primarily R&D) and retain the rest to improve liquidity. These latter activities are more consistent with the firm improving its competitive position than with shareholder rent extraction. We thus interpret these results as evidence that the narrative of shareholder rent-extraction usually attributed to corporate inversions is more applicable to product markets that are imperfectly competitive.
We find more nuanced evidence on the question of how tax-savings from inversions benefit managers across competitive and concentrated industries. While the post-inversion increases in managerial payouts are descriptively much larger in concentrated industries (annual CEO compensation increases from $8 million in the pre-period to $21 million in the post period) as compared to competitive industries ($4.6 million to $6.1 million), these differences are not statistically significant. Further, these increases are observed in both bonus and stock-based compensation making it difficult to infer whether these payouts are the result of greater rentextraction (as would be expected with bonus compensation) or attempts to reduce agencyconflicts (i.e., by granting more stock-based compensation). One interpretation for these findings is that managerial compensation is unaffected on average by inversions. Another, perhaps more plausible interpretation is that managers are able to extract some of the rents associated with tax inversions even in cases where competitive product markets mitigate shareholder rent extraction.
If so, this latter interpretation may help explain managerial lobbying support for tax inversions regardless of product market competitiveness.
We conclude with some avenues for future research. Although we do not examine how inversion-induced rent-extraction changes after industries become more competitive, a natural extension of our results is that increasing competition in product markets alleviates the "perils" of corporate inversions, particularly in industries where customers are a broad representation of society (i.e., consumers). Further, while we find that managers are able to extract some of the rents associated with tax inversions regardless of product market competition, we conjecture that more customer-focused corporate boards could mitigate managerial rents in less concentrated industries.
Corporate inversions in the context of lobbying, regulatory capture and the effect of competition
In this section we begin with a brief description of corporate inversions. While the laws governing corporate inversions might have been an outcome of lobbying, for the purposes of this study, we treat those as a historical fact about US corporate tax laws. We then develop hypotheses about the potential observable impact of corporate inversions as a function of product market competition within the industry of a corporation that has engaged in a corporate inversion.
Corporate inversions
The history of corporate inversions began in 1982 when McDermott, a Louisiana-based construction company, changed its legal domicile to Panama. The corporation's Panamanian subsidiary served as a holding company for all of McDermott's foreign operations and had built up significant profits on which the firm was reluctant to pay U.S. corporate taxes. McDermott chose instead to invert its corporate structure by making its Panamanian subsidiary the new parent of its U.S. operations. Inverting allowed McDermott to distribute its foreign profits to its shareholders as dividends while avoiding U.S. corporate taxes (see Rao (2015) for more details).
The incentives to undertake a corporate inversion are said to emanate from the US system of corporate income tax. In particular, the US uses a worldwide system of taxation that taxes the foreign income of US resident firms. However, this foreign income is subject to US taxation only when it is repatriated to the US, and companies can receive tax credits for foreign income taxes paid that they can use to offset US tax liabilities. In contrast, under a territorial system of taxation, which exists in several countries around the world, foreign income is normally exempt from taxation. This discrepancy creates incentives for U.S. firms to invert, that is, expatriate and incorporate in a foreign country (Rao (2015) ).
A corporate inversion occurs when a US company combines with a foreign company with the explicit aim of locating the residence of the resulting company in a foreign jurisdiction with a low corporate tax rate and a favorable set of tax rules and treaties (Clausing (2014) ).
Inversions often do not involve a concurrent relocation of the firm's headquarters, but merely its legal domicile (Rao (2015)).
There are several potential sources of tax advantages from inverting. First, because the US system taxes foreign income upon repatriation, many US corporations have billions of dollars held abroad that cannot be used for dividends, share repurchases, or domestic investment (Clausing, 2014) . Firms cannot return this cash to shareholders or otherwise use it in the US without incurring US corporate tax liabilities upon repatriation. A corporate inversion effectively relieves the firm of this tax burden. Technically, cash accrued before inversion within the firm's foreign affiliate still is taxable upon repatriation. When the new foreign parent is created, however, the US corporation's existing foreign affiliates can lend money to the new foreign parent, skipping the US corporation and avoiding the tax due upon repatriation. This ability to skip over the US corporation frees up the funds for more flexible use, including for issuing dividends, repurchasing shares, or funding domestic investments and acquisitions. Thus, the foreign successor to the US company can get full use of the "trapped" foreign cash stockpiles without paying US taxes.
Second, the inverted firm can establish new foreign operations without being subject to controlled foreign corporation rules. The tax savings in this case could be material enough to justify moving existing foreign operations held by the U.S. firm to the new parent. Once the assets and the business lines are no longer owned by a U.S.-incorporated firm, they are no longer subject to U.S. taxation, and consequently the firm does not owe residual U.S. taxes on what would otherwise have foreign income.
Third, there is the possibility of avoiding taxes on U.S.-source income. Once the company is inverted, it becomes easier to shift income out of the US tax base through earnings stripping. Earnings stripping occurs, for example, when corporations use loans between the new foreign parent and the US affiliate to shift income out of the United States. This happens by leveraging the US corporation, through internal loans within the multinational corporation, and deducting interest on these loans against US taxes due. (The Internal Revenue Code sets limits on such interest deductions.) Beyond interest deductions, any means of reducing the profits booked by U.S. affiliates via tax-deductible payments to the foreign parent -e.g., royalties through a treaty jurisdiction like Barbados or Luxembourg or advantageous transfer pricing -will reduce the U.S corporate tax liabilities once the firm has re-domiciled out of the American worldwide tax system.
Since corporate inversions allow more flexible access to foreign cash stockpiles and easier shifting of income out of the US tax base, there is a strong incentive for corporate inversion.
As Desai and Hines (2002) note, there are two kinds of inversions -a stock inversion and an asset inversion. In a stock inversion, U.S. shareholders execute a taxable share exchange, trading their old shares in the U.S. entity for shares in the newly created foreign entity. In an asset inversion, all of the assets of the U.S. entity are transferred to the foreign entity (which has no material assets) in exchange for stock in the foreign entity, and a taxable gain is realized on the excess of fair market value over the U.S. entity's cost basis in those assets. The U.S. entity is then liquidated and the foreign entity shares are distributed to the public shareholders.
Corporate inversions are the equivalent of rent extraction through regulatory capture achieved via lobbying
As discussed in the previous section, there are strong economic motives for corporate inversions -such inversions are a source of cash to firms. But inversions come at a direct cost to the public treasury, as they allow US firms to avoid current and future tax obligations. In this sense, inversions are inconsistent with the spirit of the US tax law, and it has been a longstanding US policy to not condone inversions. In fact, numerous politicians from across the aisle have over the years criticized inversions and proposed attempts to tighten US tax law and enforcement to reduce or eliminate inversions. For instance, mitigating corporate inversions was one reason provided by the administration of President George Bush for the passage of the American Jobs
Creation Act of 2004 -a one-time repatriation tax holiday for US multinationals. And more recently, the administration of President Barack Obama has adopted measures that make inversions less financially attractive.
But despite such political posturing and attempted proposals against inversions, the practice has endured. Corporations and lobbyists have both implicitly and explicitly defended the practice. For instance, even while publicly criticizing inversions as a tax-avoidance mechanism, former Medtronic CEO and prominent business ethicist Bill George has endorsed inversions as an effective strategic tool for sustaining competitive advantage. (e.g., Gelles (2014) and George (2014)). More recently, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the country's largest corporate lobby, has sued to stop the federal government's attempted crackdown on inversions (e.g., Jopson (2016)). And inversions remain a growth area for corporate lobbying expenditures more generally (e.g., Rubin (2014)). Perhaps as a result of this vigorous defense of the status quo, inversions have continued for over three decades.
Critics of inversions have sometimes argued that the continued existence of the practice is itself evidence of the political power of corporations and their capture of US tax law (See, e.g., Drutman (2015) for a discussion on the political "impossibility" of tax reform given the power of business lobbying). For the purposes of this study, we take no position on this question apart from assuming that inversions exist in a contested political economy and that they represent an opportunity for firms to transfer wealth from taxpayers to corporate treasuries.
Hypotheses
Economic theory predicts that, in competition, the rents accruing to firms through inversions would flow through to firms' customers in the form of lower product prices. While tax savings from inversions may be the equivalent of rents extracted through regulatory capture, firms competing with each other within an industry -either because the US firm competes with foreign firms that enjoy lower tax rates and/or the US firm competes with other US firms who also have similarly engaged in corporate inversions -will have to lower their product prices to remain competitive. Thus, the typical claim that inversions benefit a corporation's shareholders to the detriment of taxpayers is unlikely to hold in competitive industries. In fact, inversions might be a means of remaining competitive. In competition, the rent-extractive activity that an inversion potentially represents might only transfer wealth (rents) from taxpayers to the industry's clientele. And, if the industry's customer base is representative of the beneficiaries of tax revenues that otherwise would have accrued to the government, then inversions may be welfare neutral. Our empirical tests, however, are silent on whether an inverting industry's customer base mimics the pool of beneficiaries of tax revenues, and thus we make no claims whether the transfer from taxpayers to consumers is desirable or welfare neutral. We simply offer evidence whether and when corporations retain the rents from regulatory capture or whether the rents are dissipated as a result of competition.
We study the consequences of the potentially rent-extractive inversions as manifested in shareholder returns, product prices and product quality, and management compensation. Our first hypothesis is that inverting firms in competitive industries would generate lower announcement period returns to equity holders than inverting firms in non-competitive industries. The lower returns to equity holders for the inverting firms would also be manifested in lower accounting measures of returns in the post-inversion period.
A corollary to predicting lower returns to shareholders among competitive firms is the expectation of greater spending on customer-focused activities by these firms -this is our second hypothesis. Such activities, including R&D spending and product promotions, are likely to enable firms maintain a competitive edge with customers through improved product quality and lower product prices. Thus, we hypothesize that inverting firms in competitive industries expend more resources on innovation and product quality than inverting firms in non-competitive industries.
Finally, we examine the impact of product-market competition on the compensation to managers of the inverting firms in competitive and non-competitive industries. Managerial incentive-compensation is typically usually contingent on accounting-and stock-return-based metrics (e.g., Murphy (1999)). Thus, if inverting firms in competitive industries do in fact generate lower returns to shareholders (relative to firms in non-competitive industries), they should also yield lower relative returns to managers.
Results
We present two sets of analyses. The first is a short-window event-study that examines the 5-day stock market reaction to the announcement of a corporate inversion (e.g., Desai and Hines, 2002; Rao, 2015) . The second also employs the event-study methodology, but it examines long-run outcomes as appearing in a firm's financial performance and in managers' compensation. The intent is to discern systematic differences in the effects of the (tax saving) proceeds from inversions on firms belonging to concentrated versus competitive industries.
Sample
We obtain our sample of inversions from two sources - Desai and Hines (2002) Table 1 presents the list of the 43 inversions in the sample along with their respective announcement dates.
Variable definitions
Following Desai and Hines (2002) , we examine 5-day event windows centered around an inverting firm's first announcement of its decision to invert. The market's reaction to the announcement is captured via the cumulative market-adjusted return over the five-day window.
Market-adjusted return is calculated as the firm return minus the S&P 500 index return.
We follow the industrial organization literature and measure product market competition using the degree of product substitutability (e.g., Carlton and Perloff (1994) (2007)). This measure captures the idea that that the closer to (further from) perfect competition an industry is, the more (less) price approximates marginal costs. In other words, the greater the intensity of price competition due to higher product substitutability, the smaller the price-cost margin.
Price-cost margins are a preferred measure of competition for two reasons. First, the measure does not neglect private firms within the industry (the traditional sales-based Herfindahl index computed from Compustat ignores private firms, Ali, Klasa, and Yeung (2009) ). Second, the measure is influenced by foreign rivals (e.g., Edmans, Jayaraman, and Schneemeier (2016)), a substantively important factor in our setting. We define industry profit-margin (INDPM) as the inverse measure of product market competition and calculate it as the industry-level (defined at the 3-digit SIC code level) median profit margin (defined as sales (data item SALE) minus cost of goods sold (data item COGS) scaled by the latter) as of the year prior to inversion.
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In the long-run event-study, we begin by documenting the effect of inversions on firms' tax rates. To do so, we define tax rate (TAX) as total income taxes (data item TXT) scaled by lagged total assets (data item AT). With regards to the financial, product-market, and compensation effects associated with inversions, we examine four categories of firm-level responses -(i) cash retention and payouts, (ii) profitability, (iii) investing, and (iv) managerial compensation. We expect firms in concentrated industries to use the cash proceeds from inversions to increase shareholder payouts and managerial compensation. In contrast, we expect firms in competitive industries to use the proceeds to increase their sustainability (competitiveness) by increasing liquidity and investing in growth opportunities, rather than dissipating these cash flows via payouts to shareholders and managers. In constructing these measures, we assume the "proceeds" are those left over after a competitive firm has passed on some or all of the tax benefit from inversions in the form of lower product prices.
The retention/payout outcomes we examine are -cash (CASH) defined as cash and shortterm investments (data item CHE) scaled by lagged total assets, dividends per share (DPS) defined as dividends per share ex-date (data item DVPSX_F), and stock repurchases (REPURC) defined following Blouin and Krull (2009) as either as the annual change in treasury stock (data item TSTK) where available, or purchase of common and preferred stock (data item PRSTKC), expressed as a percentage of lagged total assets.
The profitability and innovation measures we examine are -return on assets (ROA) defined as net income (data item NI) scaled by lagged total assets; research and development (R&D) defined as R&D expenditures (data item XRD) scaled by lagged total assets and capital expenditures (CAPEX) defined as data item CAPX scaled by lagged total assets.
The managerial compensation variables (from Execucomp) are -total compensation (TOTCOMP) defined as the log of annual CEO compensation (data item TDC1). In addition, we examine each of the major components of total compensation viz., salary (SALARY) (data item SALARY), bonus (BONUS) (data item BONUS) and equity and other compensation (STOCK) (defined as TDC1 minus SALARY minus BONUS), respectively. Finally, we define SIZE as (the log of) firm size measured with lagged total assets.
For robustness, we define an alternative measure of competition, TNIC, defined as the number of firms that operate in the same product market space as the focal firm and is computed using the Text-based Network Industry Classification (TNIC) of Hoberg and Phillips (2016) .
TNIC depicts a negative and significant correlation with INDPM (-0.66). Panel B presents differences by market competition groups (defined as above-versusbelow median INDPM). While firms in concentrated industries pay more taxes than their competitive counterparts both before and after the inversion (which likely reflects their higher profitability levels), the magnitude of the decrease in taxes after inversions is similar across both groups. (1.2% versus 0.8%). Firms in competitive markets experience a sharp decrease in profitability after inversions (ROA falls from -0.008 to -0.049) but not those in concentrated industries (ROA increases slightly from 0.043 to 0.064). Other notable differences are the increases in share repurchases and managerial compensation within firms in concentrated industries (although these are significantly different between the groups only for total compensation and stock compensation but not salary and bonus). In subsequent tests, we examine whether these univariate results hold up to a multivariate regression design.
Descriptive statistics

Results
Short-window market reaction
Previous research by Desai and Hines (2002) inversions in the concentrated markets subsample, 16 announcements (i.e., 75%) generate a positive market reaction (and includes Herbalife) whereas five announcements earn a negative market reaction. This split between positive and negative announcement returns is 12-10 (i.e., 55%-45%) in the competitive markets group (and includes Foster Wheeler).
Overall, the short-window event-study evidence is consistent with our hypothesis that competition moderates the rent-extractive opportunity for shareholders through corporate inversions. In contrast, shareholders of firms in concentrated industries benefit from corporate inversions as they are more likely to be able to retain the resulting tax benefits.
Long-run outcomes
We examine firms' long-run responses to the inversion decision by studying changes in their cash retention, performance, investing, and managerial compensation decisions. These tests complement the short-window market reaction evidence by providing an insight into the underlying mechanisms that drive the overall shareholder value implications. Our hypothesis is that firms in concentrated industries use the proceeds from inversions for payouts (both to shareholders and to managers) while those in competitive industries use these proceeds to increase sustainability (by increasing liquidity, and deploying them towards innovation). To test these predictions, we estimate the following regression:
where, Y denotes the various firm-level outcomes that we examine, INDPM is the inverse measure of market competition (defined as of the year prior to inversion), POST is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for the post-inversion period and 0 for the pre-period. Since 
Taxes
We begin the long-run analysis by documenting the effect of corporate inversions on tax rates and examining whether this effect varies between concentrated and competitive product markets. Panel A of Figure 2 plots the average values of TAX in the pre versus post inversion periods separately for high and low INDPM industries (based on the sample median). The graph depicts a decrease in tax rates for both groups, suggesting a similar effect of inversions on tax rates across concentrated and competitive industries. We validate this evidence using regressions below.
We present two sets of results -the first uses a dichotomous classification of market competition into high and low groups while the second uses the continuous measure of INDPM.
Within each group, we present results based on the [-5, 5] and the [-10, 10] window. Results are in Table 3 . Models (1) and (2) These results not only validate the use of inversions as a vehicle for wealth transfers out of the treasury but also mitigate concerns that differences in firm-level outcomes (that we examine subsequently) might be on account of the differential tax effect of the inversion across competitive and concentrated industries. (DPS and REPURC) . We use the continuous measure of competition in these and subsequent tests (our results are similar using the dichotomous classification).
Cash retention and payouts
Results in model (1) shareholder payouts after inversions. The economic effects get larger if the event window is extended to [-10, 10] . The coefficient on POST*INDPM increases to 4.125 (significant at the 10% level), while that on POST remains negative at -1.301 (but is no longer significant). In terms of economic significance, firms in the top decile of competition reduce shareholder payouts after inversions by 0.63% of assets, while those in the bottom decile increase payouts by 1.07%. Given median firm size of $1.2 billion, these differences translate into an annual payout of $20.4 million per inverting firm. Panels B and C of Figure 2 present the changes in CASH and REPURC respectively between the pre and post periods.
Profitability and investing
Panel B of Table 4 presents the profitability and investing results. Firms in competitive industries experience a decline in profitability as seen by the negative and significant coefficients on POST in models (1) and (2). In contrast, the positive and significant coefficient coefficients on POST*INDPM indicate that such a decline is not seen in concentrated industries. In economic terms, firms in the top decile of product market competition experience a 5.69% drop in ROA while those in the bottom decile of competition experience a 1.68% increase.
The above effects can be partly driven by differences in innovation activity -as seen by the positive and significant coefficients on POST (0.336 and 0.358) and negative and significant coefficients on POST*INDPM (-0.722 and -0.801) in the R&D results of models (3) and (4). In economic terms, firms in the top decile of competition increase R&D spending by 21.87 percent while those in the bottom decile decrease innovation expenditures by 7.88%. These estimates should be interpreted cautiously as they are based on a smaller sub-sample of 62 observations with non-missing R&D (see Koh and Reeb (2015) for a discussion about missing R&D).
Models (5) and (6) 
Managerial compensation
We round up our examination of long-run outcomes by studying changes in managerial compensation. Our ex-ante expectation is that firms in concentrated product markets (but not those in competitive markets) increase payouts to managers as they do to their shareholders. (1) and (2)), it is significant only in the latter of the two models. The rest of the models split total compensation into its components. Only the stockbased compensation results yield statistical significance (and only under the [-10, 10] specification). Overall, while the data exhibit economically significant average increases in managerial rent-extraction in concentrated industries, these results are not statistically significant. Thus, the evidence on the question of how tax-savings from inversions benefit managers across competitive and concentrated industries is more nuanced. One possible interpretation is that managers of inverting firms, regardless of underlying product-market competition, experience on-average increases in compensation because they can capture some of the rents associated with tax inversions.
Sensitivity tests
We examine the sensitivity of our inferences to alternative ways of defining competition and to the use of fixed effects. In particular, we define product market competition as the number of firms that compete with the focal firm in its product space. To do so, we use Hoberg and Next, we ensure that our results are robust to including industry and firm fixed effects that absorb all unobserved, time-invariant heterogeneity across industries/firms. This evidence is important as it provides assurance that our results are not due to competitive industries (or inverting firms within these industries) being inherently different from (those in) concentrated ones. We tabulate only the firm fixed effects results since these are more stringent, but note that our results are robust to using industry fixed effects. We also present results based on clustering our standard errors by industry rather than firm. Panel B of Table 5 presents these results. While the economic significance on some of the variables diminishes (for example model (5) holds. Firms in competitive industries continue to experience a decrease in tax rates (models (1) and (2)), hold more cash (models (3) and (4)), reduce shareholder payouts (models (5) and (6)) and increase innovation expenditures.
Finally, we use a dynamic measure of competition by estimating the measure each year (rather than as of the year prior to inversion). In particular, we define INDPM as the median industry profit margin as of the start of each year. The advantage of this design is that it incorporates inter-temporal variation in product market structure between the year of inversion and when firm-level outcomes are measured. Panel C of Table 5 indicates that our inferences are robust to this dynamic measure of competition.
Summary and conclusions
The academic literature on business-government interactions has found consistent evidence of firms shaping their regulatory context. The result is potential wealth transfers from taxpayers to firms. In this study, we propose that even if such rent extractions were to exist, they are unlikely to enrich the firms' shareholders at the expense of customers if such firms operate in competitive product markets.
We test this proposition through an assessment of the dissipation of cash benefits accrued from corporate tax inversions. Such inversions, which have persisted as a practice despite criticisms from politicians across the aisle, allow firms to generate free cash by substantially reducing their tax liability. We find lower accounting and stock-market returns to shareholders of inverting firms in competitive industries (relative to those in concentrated industries). Further, inverting firms in competitive industries are more likely to improve liquidity and invest in R&D relative to those in concentrated industries.
We find more nuanced evidence on the question of how tax-savings from inversions benefit managers across competitive and concentrated industries. While the increases in managerial compensation are economically larger within concentrated industries as compared to competitive industries, these differences are not statistically significant. One interpretation of these results is that managers can extract some of the rents associated with tax inversions regardless of product-market competition. The results may help explain managerial lobbying support for tax inversions.
Because we identify competitive and concentrated industries within the sample of inverting firms, our research design mitigates endogeneity concerns that tax inversions are themselves driven by industry product-market competition. We caution that our evidence on the mitigating effect of product-market competition on shareholder rent-seeking via lobbying is limited to our singular setting -tax-motived corporate inversions. Moreover, because the population of inverting firms is small, our inferences are based on small samples. Thus, our evidence should be interpreted with attendant prudence.
We encourage future work to examine how inversion-induced rent-extraction changes as industries become more competitive (i.e., a dynamic analysis). Another productive stream of inquiry is the role of corporate governance (especially corporate boards) in mitigating managerial rent-extracting through corporate inversions. Observations after 2007 are excluded to mitigate any confounding effect of the Great Recession. TAX denotes total income taxes (data item TXT) scaled by lagged total assets (data item AT). ROA is defined as net income (data item NI) scaled by lagged total assets. R&D denotes research and development expenditures (data item XRD) scaled by lagged total assets. CAPEX denotes capital expenditures (data item CAPX) scaled by lagged total assets. CASH denotes cash and short-term investments (data item CHE) scaled by lagged total assets. DPS denotes dividends per share ex-date (data item DVPSX_F). REPURC denotes stock repurchases defined either as the annual change in treasury stock (data item TSTK) where available, or purchase of common and preferred stock (data item PRSTKC). These values have been multiplied by 100 and are thus expressed as a percentage of lagged total assets. SIZE denotes (the log of) firm size, defined as lagged total assets. INDPM is the (inverse) measure of product market competition and is defined as of the year prior to inversion as the industry-level median profit margin (defined as sales (data item SALE) minus cost of goods sold (data item COGS) scaled by COGS. Industry is defined at the 3-digit SIC code level. TNIC is an alternative measure of competition and is defined as the number of product market peers competing with the focal firm and is obtained from the sources in Hoberg and Phillips (2016) . TOTCOMP denotes (the log of) annual CEO compensation (data item TDC1) and is obtained from Execucomp. SALARY, BONUS and STOCK denote (the logs of) annual salary (data item SALARY), annual bonus (data item BONUS and equity-based compensation (defined as TDC1 minus SALARY minus BONUS), respectively. 
Table 3 Effect of corporate inversions on firm tax rates
The dependent variable is the tax rate. Models (1) and (2) are based on splitting industries into high and low competition based on the median INDPM, where Low (High) INDPM denotes competitive (concentrated) industries. POST is an indicator variable that takes 1 for the post-inversion period and 0 for the pre. Models (3) and (4) use the continuous values of INDPM. The first specification in each set uses the event-window of 5 years before and 5 years after the year of inversion ([-5, 5] ) while the second specification employs a 10-year event-window ( [-10, 10] ). All regressions include robust standard errors clustered by firm, and presented under the coefficients in parentheses. ( *** ), ( ** ), and ( * ) denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The dependent variable in each regression is noted in the row entitled "Dep. variable". All results are based on the continuous measure of INDPM. POST is an indicator variable that takes 1 for the post-inversion period and 0 for the pre. The first specification in each set uses the event-window of 5 years before and 5 years after the year of inversion ([-5, 5] ) while the second specification employs a 10-year event-window ( [-10, 10] ). All regressions include robust standard errors clustered by firm, and presented under the coefficients in parentheses. ( *** ), ( ** ), and ( * ) denotes significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
